This paper considers the effect on performance of very large controlling shareholders, who are mostly organized in voting blocks and business groups, in a sample of Belgian listed firms from 1991 to 2006. We use a non-parametric panel data analysis, which is a new technique that does not impose functional restrictions on the relation between ownership and performance. While parametric results indicate a negative effect of large shareholders on firm performance for non-family firms, non-parametric analysis shows that the effect on performance varies depending on the size of ownership stakes.
Introduction
Most of the literature that examines the relation between ownership structure and firm performance or firm value investigates the issue of managerial ownership in corporations with diffuse ownership. This goes back to the thesis of Berle and Means (1932) on the separation of ownership and control. Berle and Means argue that in a dispersed ownership setup, agency problems arise between the manager in control and the dispersed shareholders that provide finance to the corporation. Their conclusions are drawn from the observation of large U.S. corporations. Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide a formal model of this setting. The solution proposed to reduce expropriation is to give incentives to managers in order to make them align their interests to those of the shareholders. These incentives can come in the form of share ownership of the managers in the firm. Since then, a large and growing body of literature has emerged, that investigates the effect of managerial ownership on firm value. However, ownership dispersion in public corporations is not the rule everywhere. Recent studies provide evidence on ownership concentration in many countries around the world. Usually a distinction is made between Anglo-Saxon corporations which are characterized by diffused ownership, and continental European ones which are instead characterized by concentrated ownership in the hands of a small number of shareholders [La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) ; La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) ; Becht and Mayer (2001) ; Franks and Mayer (2005) ]. Still, while this characterization holds true in general, it is nonetheless the case that even in the U.S. and the U.K. large share stakes and dominant shareholders are not that uncommon, as shown in several studies like Holderness and Sheehan (1988) , Zwiebel (1995) , Leech (2002) , Demsetz (1983) , Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) , Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2008) .
Nevertheless, it is now established that ownership concentration is more common than what was admitted, even though the levels of ownership concentration may differ dramatically from one country to another. In this study we provide evidence on very high levels of ownership concentration not considered before in the literature. We use a unique and detailed database of Belgian listed firms and the composition of their shareholders for a period of sixteen years from 1991 to 2006. The first quartile of share ownership of the leading shareholder is about 40 percent of voting rights, and on average she/he holds about 53 percent. These figures of ownership concentration are not common in most countries and are a unique Belgian feature. There are two reasons why such high levels of ownership concentration are observed in Belgium. First of all there is the influence of the continental European tradition, of which Belgium is an example. On top of that there is a legal specificity in Belgium, with the existence of voting blocks and/or business groups. These voting blocks are formal agreements amongst members that are allowed by law. In this regard, Belgium offers a unique laboratory to examine the impact of powerful controlling shareholders, grouped in voting coalitions, on firm performance.
Most studies that consider ownership concentration focus on the divergence between ownership and control and the deviation from one-share one-vote through devices like multiple class shares, pyramids, and/or cross-shareholdings [see for instance, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) , Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) , and Faccio and Lang (2002) ]. One exception is the recent study by Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2008) who use a sample of U.S. firms with blockholders. They investigate the role of large shareholders on corporate policy choices and performance. However, the size of blocks in their sample is not really comparable to the largest shareholders in ours. The average block size in their sample is 9.6 percent, while, in our sample of Belgian listed firms the average size of large shareholders is about 53 percent. In fact, little work has been done to examine the impact of such majority controlling shareholders on firm value. This paper addresses this question. Our contribution is twofold. First, we study very large controlling shareholders, who are mostly organized in voting blocks and/or business groups and we investigate their impact on firm performance. As the literature suggests, we distinguish between the firms related to families and those which are not. Second, we use a non-parametric panel data analysis, which is a new technique in corporate finance, which does not impose functional restrictions on the relation between ownership of very large powerful shareholders and firm performance. We also run parametric panel data models for the sake of comparison. Furthermore, in order to alleviate potential endogeneity problems, and given the length of our sample, we run the panel models with explanatory variables lagged 5 years.
In the literature the shape of the relation between ownership and performance is very controversial. Indeed, every study seems to find a different shape depending on the functional form imposed on the relation between ownership and performance. Examples of studies with different predictions on the association between share ownership and performance are Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) , McConnell and Servaes (1990) , Himmelber, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) , Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) .
However, most of this literature is based on U.S. firms and considers the share ownership of insiders who are usually managers and members of the board. These papers aim to test the hypothesis of Berle and Means (1932) on the separation of ownership and control and investigate whether managerial ownership provides an incentive for managers to maximize firm value and consequently reduce agency problems between them and dispersed shareholders. In this study we take a different direction from the extant literature, because even though managerial ownership is present, the context is one of high levels of ownership concentration in the hands of a very small number of shareholders who are mostly voting blocks and/or business groups. Therefore the potential conflict of interest is between large and small shareowners and not between shareholders and managers. We test for this relationship by using a different econometric approach. We use a non-parametric panel data model, which does not a priori impose any functional form on the relation between share ownership of large shareholders and firm performance.
In the literature there are two views on the outcome of ownership concentration on firm value. One line of reasoning is that ownership concentration might be a way of giving incentives to shareholders to monitor managers. This would result in a positive association between ownership concentration and firm value. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) provide a theoretical justification of this argument. They confirm this view in their survey of corporate governance in 1997 and state that large shareholders have the ability to "address the agency problem in that they have both a general interest in profit maximization, and enough control over the assets of the firm to have their interest respected" (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , p.754). However, there is an alternative view which holds that ownership concentration might be a way of diverting resources. This view is also expressed in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , p.759: "As ownership gets beyond a certain point, large owners gain nearly full control of the company and are wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders." Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) argue that the valuation discount prompted by large entrenched owners in East Asian countries is not due to actions related to blocking value-enhancing takeovers, but is related instead to actions of extracting private benefits and direct expropriation through transfer of financial wealth to affiliated firms. Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) refer to the transfer of resources out of a company to its controlling shareholders as "tunneling". They point out that this expropriation can take different forms like the transfer by the controlling shareholder of resources from the firm to his own benefit through self-dealing transactions; transfer pricing advantageous to the controlling shareholder; excessive executive compensation; loan guarantees to the controlling shareholder; expropriation of corporate opportunities, and so on. Goergen and Renneboog (2001) give a concrete example of how this mechanism of expropriation works. Their example is about a large Belgian utility company, Tractabel, whose CEO was dismissed by the controlling shareholder, Suez/Lyonnaise des Eaux, a French holding company. This happened because the CEO of Tractabel engaged in an aggressive international growth strategy and was determined to pursue it. This was seen by the mother company, Suez/Lyonnaise des Eaux, as enhancing competition between Tractebel and the energy subsidiaries of Suez/Lyonnaise des Eaux and they decided to stop it. This example shows that the fact that large controlling shareholders could exercise expropriation is more than just a theoretical possibility. In the Belgian case, Colmant and Servaty (2003) and Siaens and Walravens (1993) show that listed firms, particularly holding companies, trade at a discount. In the absence of multiple class shares, which are prohibited by law, this discount could be attributed to financial transfers to affiliated firms.
Our results show that with the parametric approach the size of the controlling shareholders has a negative effect on performance. This suggests that there is expropriation exercised by powerful shareholders. However, our nonparametric estimation suggests significant departures from linearity in the relation between between the size of the controlling shareholders and performance. There is a positive association between share ownership of large controlling shareholders and firm performance at a high rate in the range between 25 and 35 percent of ownership. Between 35 and 50 percent the relation is still positive, but less pronounced. Between 50 and 55 percent there is a slight decrease, and between 60 and 70 percent it increases again with a peak at 70 percent. Finally, in the range between 70 percent and 85 percent there is a marked decrease. These turning points in the relation between the ownership of large controlling shareholders and firm performance correspond to critical thresholds in terms of control.
We also explore the link of firms to families. Our interest in this is to investigate wether there are differences between firms related to families and those without such a link. In terms of presence of family firms, Belgium is in line with the continental European tradition. Many studies analyze family firms for different countries and most of the results seem to support the view that family firms perform better than the others (see for instance Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Raphael (2006) for two different samples of U.S. firms, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) for a sample of French firms, and Maury (2006) for 13 Western European countries). Other studies report however, the opposite (see for instance Bennedsen, Meisner Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2007) The main argument in favor of the superior performance of family firms is that families can be considered stable investors that are there for several generations (James (1999) , Anderson and Reeb (2003) ). However, family firms could lead to poor performance if the family controlling shareholders take advantage of their position and exchange profits for private benefits and forgo profitable projects (Demsetz (1983) .) Our parametric panel data estimations show that the negative effect of controlling shareholders on firm performance is confirmed only for non-family firms, while for firms related to families the impact of controlling shareholders is positive. This tends to confirm the superior performance of family firms compared to non-family ones as was shown in the literature in different ownership contexts.
Coordination centers are another feature of Belgian corporate governance that is worth noting. These centers enjoy very attractive tax benefits and allow their group members to profit from these tax advantages. Since 2008 these centers are officially prohibited by law (some continue until 31 December 2010 under certain conditions), but they were in effect during our sample period and they played an active role.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the sample selection procedure and the data sources. Section 3 is dedicated to the description of the large controlling shareholders. In Section 4 we present the estimation framework. Section 5 presents the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Sample selection and data sources
Sample selection
The sample covers the period from 1991 to 2006. Over this period we select firms that satisfy the following criteria:
-Listed firms except banks, insurance companies, common investment funds, companies in activities auxiliary to financial intermediation, companies active in other financial intermediation, and real estate firms.
-Listed firms for which the balance sheet data is available. For the period from 1991 to 1996 we use data available in the data set of the "National Bank of Belgium (NBB)", and then for the period from 1997 to 2006 we use the database called "Belfirst" available from Bureau Van Dijk.
-Listed firms for which there is a declaration of control. Hence, we exclude firms with 100 percent of free float. For the period considered there are 23 observations (firm/year) with a 100 percent of free float. Data on ownership was collected manually as we explain in the next subsection.
-Excluded from the sample were some companies in coal mining and steel production that were involved in a long liquidation process but were still listed and have incomplete data. Dijk. However, this database cannot be used as it is and needs an almost manual clean up. For instance, for some firm year observations, shareholders appear twice with different shareholdings. In other instances shareholders disappear for a year then they reappear. In other cases the reported data is not from the last declaration of the year. We construct the share ownership variables from the ownership database that we build.
To classify shareholders per sector of activity we use the "Amadeus" database of Bureau Van Dijk. Shareholders could be of any nationality and "Amadeus" contains data on public and private companies in 41 European countries. Shareholders that are not reported in "Amadeus" we search for them on the internet.
National Bank of Belgium and Belfirst databases
We rely on two sources for the data from the annual accounts. For the period from 1991 to 1996 we use the database "Centrale des Bilans" edited on CD-ROMs by the NBB and for the period from 1997 to 2006 we use the "Belfirst" database of Bureau Van Dijk. From these databases we collect data like short and long term debts, total assets, investment in financial assets, tangible assets, and R&D expenses, etc. From these items we construct the explanatory variables that we use in our study. We use two CD-ROMs with the data from NBB. The first one, edited in 1995, contains annual accounts for 1991, 1992, and 1993.
The second one, edited in 1998, contains annual accounts for 1994, 1995, and 1996 . From "Belfirst" we use the year end CD-ROMs for each year from 1997 to 2006. Firms were identified by their VAT code. The identification process of firms was done as follows: (1) we get the names of Belgian listed firms from the Brussels Stock Exchange; then (2) we check for their VAT codes in the "Memento des Valeurs" ; (3) with the firm VAT code that we have from "Memento des Valeurs" it is easy to find the exact firm we are looking for on the NBB or "Belfirst" sources. Identification of firms by their VAT code is the best way, because it avoids any confusion between firms with similar names.
The year-end market capitalization of listed firms is collected from the Brussels Stock Exchange.
Description of large controlling shareholders
What is the threshold above which shareholdings can be considered to be concentrated? The rule of thumb that is established in the literature considers that ownership is concentrated if the largest shareholder holds more than 10 percent of voting rights. Sometimes that threshold is set at 20 percent (see for instance studies like La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) , Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), or Faccio and Lang (2002) ).
In this paper we are far beyond these figures because on average a shareholder holds about 53 percent of voting rights. In Belgian listed firms there exist three categories of shareholders. The first category is direct stakes which are holdings of single shareholders, either moral or physical persons. The second category is group blocks which are the stakes of companies that are part of a business group which are subject to consolidation rules under Belgian law. Finally, there can be voting blocks which are composed of direct stakes and/or group blocks. A voting block is a voting coalition where shareholders declare that they act in unison together. By joining a voting coalition shareholders gain a great power in terms of voting rights. Even when we consider firms without taking into account voting blocks the share ownership of the largest shareholders is already quite high. There are two dimensions in ownership concentration which are the percentage of share ownership and the number of shareholders located in the same firm. When we look at the number of shareholders, we see that there are very few shareholders in the same firm. From Table 1 Panel A, we can see that in about 15 percent of firm-year observations there is only one single shareholder and in about 62 percent there are between one and four shareholders in the same firm. In only one percent of firm-year observations there are more than 18 shareholders and up to 26. Generally, these very few shareholders join together and form the voting blocks. When we consider voting blocks the number of shareholders decreases even more. Table 1 Panel B shows that in 29 percent of firm-year observations there exists only one voting block, in 1.81 percent there are two, and in 0.32 there are three. In almost 37 percent of firm-year observations there is a single business group (Table 1 Panel C). In 9 percent two business groups locate in the same firm. Finally, in less than 1 percent there are as many as 4 or 5 business groups. These business groups can also join together and form voting blocks. In Table 1 Panel D, we observe that in almost 8 percent of firm-year observations one business group is a member of a voting block and in almost 7 percent there are between 2 and 4 business groups that form voting blocks.
In terms of percentage of share ownership there are also patterns of ownership concentration. Table 2 shows that SING, which is the variable for all single shareholders taken individually without considering voting blocks or business groups, has on average about 14 percent. However, when we turn to the variables on the first largest shareholder these numbers explode. The variable LS2, in Table 2 , reports the shareholding of the first largest shareholder without taking into account voting blocks or business groups, has on average 42 percent. These figures are even higher when we look at the variable LS which is the first largest shareholder taking into account voting blocks or business groups. The average increases to around 53 percent. Now we can ask who are these shareholders? Which sectors of the economy do they belong to? For each shareholder we look up at its sector of activity in "Amadeus" database and on the internet if it was not available. The results of this classification are reported in Figure 4 shows the distribution of large controlling shareholders when we take into account business groups and voting blocks. There are peaks in the distribution of share ownership that corresponds to thresholds that are meaningful in terms of control. Figure 4 shows a significant peak the 50-55 percent range which is the threshold for the majority level. There is also a peak for the of 25-30 percent range, which could be due to the Belgian legislation on tax reduction on dividends. Indeed, according to Belgian law when a shareholder reaches the threshold of 25 percent of voting rights she/he benefits from an exemption of taxes on dividends. The last peak is at 75 percent, which is the threshold required by Belgian law to modify the statutes of the firm. If we compare Figure 3 to Figure 4 we observe that the distribution of share ownership is different. However, the peaks remains at the same thresholds but with different magnitudes. This shows that voting blocks are formed strategically often to obtain a desired level of ownership for control.
Estimation framework 4.1 Parametric panel data models
We first use parametric panel data models. We run estimations in OLS-pooled, fixed effects, and random effects models of performance on lagged regressors. The basic OLS equation is:
where Y it is performance, Z it−5 is shareholdings of the largest controlling shareholders, X it−5 includes other control variables like investment in financial fixed assets, firm size, debts, etc, β 0 is the intercept, β 1 and β 2 are the coefficients and it is an error term. We lag the regressors five periods because for instance ownership, our main variable of interest, varies slowly over time. Also, this resolves potential endogeneity problems with the ownership variable.
We estimate both fixed and random effects model, which corresponds to different assumptions on the error term, it . In the random effects model [ it = µ i + υ it ] and υ it is assumed to be homoscedastic and uncorrelated over time. The component µ i is time invariant and homoscedastic across individuals. Hence, we obtain the following:
In the fixed effects model we include an individual-specific intercept term. The overall intercept β 0 is omitted, as it is subsumed by the individual intercepts µ i :
where µ i is a fixed effects term that captures heterogeneity between firms.
Non-parametric panel
We estimate a non-parametric panel, because this gives us the flexibility not to impose any a priori functional form on the variables of interest, while simple econometric models assume linear, quadratic, or cubic relations between variables. Very often economic theory predicts the sign of the relation between variables, but theory rarely provides predictions about the shape of the relation. Non-parametric methodology allows us to be agnostic about the functional form of the relation between the variables of interest.
In the literature, the shape of the relation between share holdings and performance is somewhat controversial. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) However, the graph is about insider ownership, while the object of our interest in this paper is the share ownership of very large controlling shareholders.
In this paper we investigate the association between the shareholdings of very large controlling shareholders on firm performance using a nonparametric econometric approach. We use the recent methodology developed by Henderson and Ullah (2005) for the case of random effects and the model of Henderson, Carroll, and Li (2008) , which generalizes the approach to fixed effects panel data. The non-parametric version of the fixed effects equation is the following:
where m(.) is the mean function which can be potentially non-linear. We can interpret the first derivative of m(.) like a parameter:
is constant, and we are back in the traditional linear panel case.
Unfortunately, this estimation has a serious practical problem, which is the well-known curse of dimensionality, which means that the precision of the estimates decreases dramatically as the dimension of the regressors increases. This will typically be the case, since we want to include many control variables. The solution to this problem consists in using the semiparametric fixed effects model. This consists in modeling the effect of a subset of variables non-parametrically, while the effect of the remaining variables is linear. In our context, we estimate the effect of share holdings Z it in a non-parametric manner, while the effect of the control variables X it are kept linear. This leads to the following estimation: Henderson, Carroll, and Li (2008) propose to estimate the semi-parametric model using backtesting. They also propose an extension of the Hausman test for the null hypothesis of random effects against the alternative of fixed effects, as well as a test of the semi-parametric model against a fully linear model.
Results
We run estimations first with parametric panel data models. We use Pooled-OLS, fixed effects, and random effects models. In a second stage we run our estimation using the semi-parametric model. The results of the parametric models are reported in Panel A of Table 4 , and they show a negative association between share ownership of large controlling shareholders and performance. This suggests that there are private benefits of control that are being extracted. As most listed firms are related to groups this may indicate that there is tunneling, as described by Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) . However, when we subdivide the sample into one sub-sample with family firms and a second one with the remaining firms we see that this effect vanishes for family firms, while it is still present for non-family ones. This result is in line with findings in the literature, that family firms outperform non-family ones.
In Panel B of Table 4 , we include in the estimations a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the shareholder is in the financial sector (it is mainly financial holding companies and the managing companies of holding companies). We call this variable "Dum65". We also include an interaction variable between "Dum65" and the the first largest controlling shareholder in the firm (the variable "LS"), the interaction variable is called "LS*65". We introduce these variables in order to examine whether belonging or not to the financial sector has an effect on the behavior of large shareholders. The results with these variables show that the negative effect of the largest controlling shareholders is attributable to the fact that they are holding companies and companies managing their activities. This confirms the tunneling hypothesis for firms belonging to business groups. These results apply to non-family firms but not to firms with ties to a family, which confirms again that family firms have a different behavior from the rest.
In the nonparametric fixed effects estimation the shape of the relationship between largest controlling shareholder and firm performance is not linear. It is significantly negative in the threshold between 70 percent and 85 percent of share ownership. This threshold corresponds to the one required by law to modify the statutes of firms. Usually, when a shareholder reaches this threshold there are very important changes in the strategy of the firm. Hence, the negative impact in this range may indicate that there is a sort of tunneling as described by Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) . In the other ranges of ownership the shape of the relationship seems to be positive. It is not monotonic but the shape in general is positive. It seems that there is more or less convergence of interests up to a certain point, which is the 70 percent level of ownership (the point where the largest controlling shareholders have the power to decide alone).
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyze levels of ownership concentration not considered before in the literature and we show how large controlling shareholders affect firm value. We use a unique detailed database on share ownership of Belgian listed firms which exhibit levels of ownership concentration ignored in the literature. This makes Belgian listed firms a real laboratory to examine such issues of ownership structure and performance. Our contribu-tion is also in the use of an innovative econometric approach in estimating the relationship between very large controlling shareholders and firm performance. We use non-parametric panel data models, which means that we do not impose any functional form on the variables. This has the advantage of avoiding the big controversy on how should be the shape of ownership and performance. As a matter of comparison we also use panel data parametric models. Our results show that in panel data parametric models the impact of large controlling shareholders on firm performance is negative, and this is true when large shareholders are financial holdings firms and firms related to their activities. This result confirms the expropriation exercised by controlling shareholders in countries (or in firms) where there are pyramidal groups and some of the subsidiaries take advantage from other ones. The expropriation could also be in other forms of tunneling as argued in Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) . However, this is not the case for family firms while it is true for non-family ones. This is in accordance with other studies for other economies where it is found that family firms outperform non-family ones. The results in the fixed effects semi-parametric panel data estimation however, show that expropriation takes place in the range of ownership that allows large controlling shareholders to make major changes in the statues of the corporation. it is computed as the log of total assets. Age is the age in years of firms. LT. Debt are long term debts divided by total assets. ST. Debt are short term debts divided by total assets. TOT. Debt are total debts divided by total assets. CAP.EX is the variable for capital expenditures for the acquisition of new investments. It is the amount of new acquisition divided by total assets. R&D are the expenses in research and development divided by total assets. FFA is the investment in financial fixed assets divided by total assets. Div is the amount of dividends divided by total assets. The dependent variable is firm performance measured by market to book value at time t. LS is the variable for the shareholding of the largest shareholder in the firm at time t − 5 taking into account business groups and voting blocks. Size is the size of firms and it is computed as the log of total assets at time t − 5. Tot.Debt are total debts divided by total assets at time t − 5. FFA is the investment in financial fixed assets divided by total assets at time t − 5. Dum65 is a dummy variable for the sector to which belong a shareholder, it takes on the value of 1 if the sector is a financial one and 0 otherwise. LS*65 is an interaction variable between the dummy variable Dum65 and LS. FFA is the investment in financial fixed assets divided by total assets. R&D are the expenses in research and development divided by total assets. Size is the size of firms and it is computed as the log of total assets. Tot.Debt are total debts divided by total assets. FFA is the investment in financial fixed assets divided by total assets. R&D are the expenses in research and development divided by total assets. Size is the size of firms and it is computed as the log of total assets. ST. Debt are short term debts divided by total assets. LT. Debt are long term debts divided by total assets. Div is the amount of dividends divided by total assets. Fam is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm is related to a family and 0 otherwise. FFA is the investment in financial fixed assets divided by total assets. R&D are the expenses in research and development divided by total assets. Size is the size of firms and it is computed as the log of total assets. ST. Debt are short term debts divided by total assets. LT. Debt are long term debts divided by total assets. Div is the amount of dividends divided by total assets. Fam is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm is related to a family and 0 otherwise. CC is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm is related to a coordination center and 0 otherwise.
